

Exhibit E

PARTICULARLY
SENSITIVEAl-Fadl
3501-13

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/4/98

On 1/8/98, 1/14/98, 1/23/98, and 2/20/98, a Co-operating Witness (CW) was interviewed at an undisclosed location. Present during the interviews on 1/8/98 and 1/14/98 were FBI Special Agents _____ New York City Police Department Detective _____ and Assistant United States Attorney (Southern District of New York) KEN KARAS. Present during the 1/23/98 interview were FBI Special Agent _____ and AUSA KEN KARAS. Present during the 2/20/98 interview were FBI Special Agents _____ and AUSA KEN KARAS.

The topic covered in this interview was MADANI AL-TAYYIB. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB's full name is SAIDI MADANI AL-TAYYIB and that he also used the aliases ABU FADIL and ABU FADIL AL-MAKKI. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB is Saudi Arabian of Moroccan descent, is in his early to mid 30's, approximately 5'9", fair skinned (almost pale), and has light colored hair. Furthermore, AL-TAYYIB is missing his right leg up to the knee.

The CW advised that he first met AL-TAYYIB in the early part of 1988 at the JAJI (phonetic) base located on the front lines of Afghanistan in an area called the PAKTIA state. At this time, the JAJI base was logically run by ABU ABDUL RAHMAN AL-SAHRAHI and the military leader (Emir) for this camp was ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI. However, the CW advised that this was an OSAMA BIN LADIN and ABDULLAH AZZAM base. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB was using the name ABU FADIL MAKKI and that he (AL-TAYYIB) may have gotten to this base just before the CW. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB was conducting logistical work under ABU ANTER AL-MASRI and ABU OMAR AL-MAKKI.

The CW also saw AL-TAYYIB at the AL-ARIN camp in Afghanistan. This camp was run by a Saudi Arabian known as ABU NOFUR (ph). The CW advised that ABU NOFUR's true name is MAJID AL-KAAKI (ph). The CW advised that this was also an OSAMA BIN LADIN camp and that he (BIN LADIN) also maintained a bunker at this camp. The CW explained that this camp was used for storing

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by _____

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supplies and weapons. This camp, according to the CW, also housed a small hospital. The CW advised that he and AL-TAYYIB worked at this camp under ABU TURAB AL-MASRI and that the camp would often receive shipments of new weapons which were then cleaned and test fired. Supplies stored at this camp also included food, clothing, boots, shovels, medicine, etc.

After the AL-ARIN camp, the CW, AL-TAYYIB and approximately 100-115 people went with ABU TALHA CHECKASI (ph), a Jordanian and Emir of this group, to an area called SARKHAB in the LOGAR state of Afghanistan near Kabul to fight against the communists.

From SARKHAB, AL-TAYYIB was sent to the MOHAMMED AGA area of the LOGAR state and approximately two weeks later the CW followed. The CW advised that this area was the front lines between the Mujahideen and the communists and that people were sent there by a number system. The CW and AL-TAYYIB spent approximately two months together in the MOHAMMED AGA area. The CW advised that while they were in the MOHAMMED AGA area, the Russians attacked the Mujahideen and pushed them out of the MOHAMMED AGA and SARKHAB areas back to AL-ARIN. From AL-ARIN, the CW, AL-TAYYIB, and approximately 80 others were sent to Peshawar, Pakistan for a rest.

While in Peshawar, the CW advised that AL-TAYYIB was sent to KHOST and worked under an Egyptian named SABIR in an engineering section responsible for such things as building new camps and mine clearing. The CW heard that while AL-TAYYIB was in KHOST, he (AL-TAYYIB) traveled several times back and forth to Saudi Arabia. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB's brother worked for Saudi Air. The CW also believed that AL-TAYYIB's brother was involved in transporting supplies to Afghanistan using Saudi Air.

The CW advised that in late 1989, AL-TAYYIB went to Saudi Arabia and was involved in lecturing, propaganda, collecting money, etc. The CW advised that during this time, AL-TAYYIB was working under ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI, the individual who ran the ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION in Peshawar, Pakistan. The CW believes that ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI is in fact

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OSAMA BIN LADIN's cousin.

The CW advised that during this time frame, OSAMA BIN LADIN's organization started to become more structured and started to go by the name AL-QAIDA. The CW advised that the members of the group were now making BAYAT, filling out formal paperwork and giving allegiance to AL-QAIDA and OSAMA BIN LADIN.

Also during this period, ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI became the military Emir of AL-QAIDA under OSAMA BIN LADIN and ABU HAFS AL-MASRI, aka ABU HAFS AL-KABIR, became the Emir of camps. ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI continued to be the Emir of finance and AL-TAYYIB continued to work under ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI. The CW advised that ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI would give money to AL-TAYYIB who would then distribute certain amounts to both SHEIKH SAID AL-MASRI (an Egyptian) and ABU YASSIR SARRIR (an Algerian), aka ABU YASSIR AL-GIZARI (ph). These two individuals were in charge of salary, travel, and health benefits for AL-QAIDA. During this time frame, the CW advised that he would see AL-TAYYIB frequently, but not as often as when they were in the camps together because AL-TAYYIB was moving up in the organization.

The CW advised that he was then sent to JALALABAD and AL-TAYYIB was sent to the KHARKULA (ph) guesthouse in Peshawar, Pakistan. After JALALABAD, the CW was sent to Peshawar and was told by ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI to go to Sudan. Also present during this meeting at the Islamic Relief guesthouse was MOHAMMED YASSIR AL-MASRI and ABU HAFS AL-KABIR, aka ABU HAFS AL-MASRI. The CW recalls this to be late 1989 or early 1990 because he went to Sudan after the coup d'etat (Note: The coup occurred in June 1989). Before going to Sudan, the CW was given \$55,000 USD and 17,000 Saudi Riyals by AL-TAYYIB to rent a guesthouse and office in Khartoum. The CW advised that ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI gave the CW paperwork for AL-TAYYIB to release the money. The CW advised that during this time frame, MOHAMMED YASSIR AL-MASRI (supra) worked with OSAMA BIN LADIN, but that he was actually a member of a terrorist organization known as EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD. (Further information regarding this transaction is located on page 8)

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While in Sudan, the CW learned that AL-TAYYIB lost his right leg up to the knee on a land mine in Afghanistan. In the early part of 1991, AL-TAYYIB also went to Sudan and moved there after OSAMA BIN LADIN's visit the Sudan. The CW believed that OSAMA BIN LADIN and AL-TAYYIB may have moved to Sudan at the same time. At this time, the CW advised that he was traveling between Sudan and Peshawar renting guesthouses, offices and even purchased a farm in Sudan for AL-QAIDA.

The CW advised that when he went back to Sudan on a permanent basis, OSAMA BIN LADIN told him not to talk negatively about the National Islamic Front (as he had in the past) with the Sudanese people because the National Islamic Front (NIF) was sensitive about the issue. At the same time, OSAMA BIN LADIN told the NIF that the CW would behave. The CW advised that OSAMA BIN LADIN was dealing directly with ALI OSMAN MOHAMMED TAHA, the current Secretary of State of Sudan. The CW was told by OSAMA BIN LADIN that he (CW) will be working for AL-TAYYIB. The CW believed that it was at AL-TAYYIB's request that he (CW) was told by OSAMA BIN LADIN to work for him (AL-TAYYIB) in Sudan.

During this time frame, AL-TAYYIB took ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI's position as Emir of finances for AL-QAIDA. According to the CW, AL-TAYYIB was now in charge of all of OSAMA BIN LADIN's money in Sudan, his companies, as well as his money with the NIF, for example, the AL-HIDRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY's road project to connect Khartoum and Port Sudan.

Only after a few months of the CW's arrival to Sudan, AL-TAYYIB married OSAMA BIN LADIN's uncle's (SAID BIN LADIN) daughter and became one of OSAMA BIN LADIN's closest associates. After this marriage, AL-TAYYIB became a secretary (in a high ranking manner) in AL-QAIDA and was now in charge of most of OSAMA BIN LADIN's money, including the money located outside of Sudan. During this period in Sudan, AL-QAIDA became known as the ISLAMIC ARMY.

The CW advised that while he worked under AL-TAYYIB, the ISLAMIC ARMY created many OSAMA BIN LADIN companies such as TABA INVESTMENT, BIN LADIN INTERNATIONAL, which was located on

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McNimer street in Khartoum, the BLESSED FRUITS COMPANY, which was responsible for the DAMAZIN and KASSALA camps, and the QUDARAT TRANSPORT COMPANY. They were also responsible for obtaining licenses to ship animals and purchased the SOBA training camp. At this time, OSAMA BIN LADIN became a partner in the ANIMAL RESOURCES BANK. The CW advised that he and AL-TAYYIB traveled together to KASSALLA, PORT SUDAN, and AL-POWER, an area where peanut farmers are located.

While in Port Sudan, AL-TAYYIB gave the CW \$50,000 USD to purchase a facility to process salt from the Red Sea. The CW advised that this facility included an office, guesthouse and processing facility and was located approximately two hours driving time away from the city. The CW advised that this facility was used by the ISLAMIC ARMY to store and ship weapons. Although the facility was not purchased on this initial visit to Port Sudan, the CW advised that on a subsequent trip to the city without AL-TAYYIB, the facility was purchased. The CW advised that he was accompanied on the subsequent trip by ABDEL AZIZ MOHAMMED ISSAWI, a former Sudanese police officer working for the Sudanese Security Service with the rank of one eagle (in Arabic called RAID which translates into Major). The CW advised that ISSAWI was a member of the NIF, a Sudanese Tae Khwon Do camp and last known to be residing in Canada.

The CW further advised that AL-TAYYIB controlled and monitored OSAMA BIN LADIN's money and kept portions of the money in banks under his (AL-TAYYIB) own name and in other names such as ABU AMJED, ABU MAHDI, and ABU KHALLIFAH AL-OMANI. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB opened several accounts for the LADIN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY at the AL-SHAMAL BANK in Khartoum including one account under his (AL-TAYYIB) own name, a second account under his and OSAMA BIN LADIN name, and a third account under his, OSAMA BIN LADIN, and the CW's name for foreign business transactions only. The CW advised that during the earlier part of OSAMA BIN LADIN's stay in Sudan, most of the business accounts were with AL-SHAMAL BANK and FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK. According to the CW, AL-TAYYIB used his true name when opening these accounts. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB also opened a US dollar account at CITIBANK which was later closed. A US dollar account was also

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held at the AL-SHAMAL BANK. The CW further advised that OSAMA BIN LADIN used AL-TAYYIB to hide part of his money after he (BIN LADIN) had his problems with the Saudi authorities regarding his activities.

The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB held other accounts at the following banks in Sudan: ISLAMIC WEST BANK, BANK OF KHARTOUM, BANK OF SAUDI-SUDANI, AL-BARAKA SUDANESE BANK, ANIMAL RESOURCES BANK, and NILEIM INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accounts held at banks located outside the Sudan included the following: BARCLAYS BANK, MASHREQ BANK, FAISAL AL-BAHRAIN, and TADAMON BANK. The CW further advised that AL-TAYYIB had a relationship with AHMED LOOTAH from the United Arab Emirates.

The CW advised that during 8/92, he was sent by OSAMA BIN LADIN and AL-TAYYIB to Budapest, Hungary and Zagreb, Croatia. On this trip, the CW traveled to Budapest via Sofia, Bulgaria. While in Budapest, the CW stayed at an OSAMA BIN LADIN guesthouse and was told to meet with a Lebanese guy whose name the CW could not remember. The CW advised that the Lebanese individual never showed up and he then continued his trip to Zagreb. The CW advised that he was sent to Zagreb to find out more information regarding the privatization of businesses in Croatia and to obtain more information regarding the banking system, ie. currency conversions. The CW was ordered by OSAMA BIN LADIN and AL-TAYYIB to meet with ABU ABDEL RAHMAN AL-DOSARI when he arrived in Zagreb. The CW advised that he met AL-DOSARI at an office called the THIRD WORLD (CW could not remember the rest of the name) headed by a Sudanese NIF member named EL-FATIH ABU HASSANIEN. The CW advised that this organization also had an office located in Vienna, Austria.

The CW advised that while in Zagreb, Croatia, he had heard about about a big non-secret meeting involving Islamic scholars to discuss ways to co-ordinate the relief effort in Bosnia. The CW heard about this meeting from AL-DOSARI, a Syrian male whose name he could not remember of the AL-BIR AL-DAWALIA (ph), an Islamic relief organization, and possibly ABU AL-ZABIR AL-MADANI. The CW advised that ABU AL-ZABIR AL-MADANI is one of OSAMA BIN LADIN's cousins and was a commander in Jalalabad under

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OSAMA BIN LADIN during the war in Afghanistan.

While in Zagreb, the CW accompanied AL-DOSARI and DR. IBRAHIM (LNU) to three refugee/DAWA camps. The CW advised that these were not military camps, but they were used to recruit people. The CW believed that the camps were funded by OSAMA BIN LADIN through the organization called THIRD WORLD (rest of the name he could not remember) (supra) and EL-FATIH ABU HASSANIAN (supra). Approximately October 1992, the CW departed Croatia and went back to Khartoum via Budapest. While in Budapest, he stayed in a OSAMA BIN LADIN guesthouse for a few days.

After the CW's arrival in Khartoum, he went to see AL-TAYYIB and ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI and gave a report to AL-TAYYIB concerning his mission in Croatia. The CW also advised that he subsequently gave OSAMA BIN LADIN a two hour briefing on his mission. The CW advised that BIN LADIN seemed concerned about the business aspects regarding privatization and the banking system in Croatia, as well as his reputation in Bosnia.

The CW advised that when OSAMA BIN LADIN went to the Sudan, the ISLAMIC ARMY grew. As it grew the CW advised that it became closer with other terrorist groups and a formal SHURA COUNCIL was formed. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB was a part of this SHURA COUNCIL from the very beginning. AT this time, AL-TAYYIB basically became the man in charge of most of the finances for the ISLAMIC ARMY and attended nightly meetings with OSAMA BIN LADIN to discuss monetary issues. The CW advised that no one, except OSAMA BIN LADIN, could make any decisions regarding money without an order coming from AL-TAYYIB.

The following are examples of AL-TAYYIB's involvement with OSAMA BIN LADIN and the ISLAMIC ARMY:

1) (Supra) The CW advised that approximately 1990 while he was in Peshawar, Pakistan, he was ordered by ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI to go to Sudan and help NOUH AL-MASRI and ABDEL AZIZ MOHAMED ISSAWI, aka ABU AL-HASSAN AL-SUDANI by taking money to these two individuals. AL-BANSHIRI gave the CW a letter addressed to AL-TAYYIB for him (AL-TAYYIB) to give the CW the

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money. AL-TAYYIB then gave the CW \$55,000 USD and 17,000 Saudi Riyals. The CW advised that he went to Sudan and gave NOUH AL-MASRI and ISSAWI part of the money and used the rest (with ISSAWI) to purchase several vehicles. As a side note, the CW advised that ISSAWI was involved in bringing Egyptian terrorists into Sudan from Egypt.

2) During late 1992, the CW recalls being told by AL-TAYYIB to go to Amman, Jordan and bring money to ABU AKRAM. At a later date and after the CW obtained a visa, AL-TAYYIB gave the CW \$200,000 USD in two separate \$100,000 packs. The CW then flew Sudan Airways to Amman and gave ABU AKRAM the money which was used to support both the families of the martyrs and families of people who were in jail as a result of terrorist activities. The CW further believed that some of the money was used to support ABU AKRAM's farm outside of Amman, a guesthouse and mosque located at the farm. The CW advised that the money was basically given to ABU AKRAM for the ABU ALI GROUP, an organization the CW described as a terrorist group. The CW advised that he spent four or five days with ABU AKRAM before returning to Sudan.

The CW advised that ABU AKRAM is a Jordanian from Palestine and part of a Palestinian Jihad group. Furthermore, the CW advised that ABU AKRAM is part of OSAMA BIN LADIN's SHURA COUNCIL and the political and financial leader of the ABU ALI GROUP. ABU AKRAM was with AL-QAIDA in Afghanistan and later with the ISLAMIC ARMY. According to the CW, ABU AKRAM started the MAKTAB AL-KHIDMAT RELIEF ORGANIZATION in Peshawar in the early 1980's and started the first Arab Afghan training camp in Afghanistan at the start of the war called the WARSAK CAMP. Finally, the CW believes that ABU AKRAM is currently in his late 50's or early 60's.

3) In early 1993, the CW advised that he was with ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI and AL-TAYYIB when they went to an ERITREAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ) guesthouse located in the Riyadh section of Khartoum. At this guesthouse, AL-TAYYIB gave SHEIKH ARAFA what he believed to be \$100,000 USD. The CW described SHEIKH ARAFA as being the political leader of this EIJ terrorist group. Also present at this guesthouse was MOHAMED KHAIR, a member of EIJ.

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The CW advised that during this meeting he only accompanied AL-TAYYIB and AL-BANSHIRI and never handled the money.

4) (Supra) The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB gave him \$50,000 USD to purchase a salt making facility near Port Sudan which was purchased under the CW's name. This facility was used by OSAMA BIN LADIN's ISLAMIC ARMY to store weapons and to move terrorists in and out of the country. Approximately \$4,000 of the \$50,000 was used to rent apartments that were used as guesthouses for these terrorists in the TARIB HADIL section of Port Sudan. These apartments were rented and run by ISSAWI.

5) During late 1992, AL-TAYYIB told the CW to go to AL-QADARIF and meet AKRAM YOUSIF ABBASS, the manager of the DANFUDYO COMPANY, an NIF front company. AL-TAYYIB told the CW that the DANFUDYO COMPANY would help him (CW) get started in trading sesame seeds and that the CW would pay them a commission. The CW advised that an agreement was made between the LADIN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY and the DANFUDYO COMPANY. The companies were involved in purchasing sesame from local farmers. After the CW met AKRAM YOUSIF ABBASS, he (CW) opened a bank account and told AL-TAYYIB that they were ready to do business. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB then sent the CW in excess of \$1,000,000 over the course of three weeks to purchase sesame.

The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB instructed the CW to set up the same type of businesses involving peanuts and sunflower seeds.

The CW advised that he and AL-TAYYIB were also involved in the payment aspects of the "challenge road" built by OSAMA BIN LADIN for the Sudanese government. To pay OSAMA BIN LADIN for building the road, the NIF gave BIN LADIN sesame without levying export and customs taxes, as opposed to cash because of the currency problem with the Sudanese Pound. Further payment for the "challenge road" and other road construction projects included the NIF giving OSAMA BIN LADIN the KASSALLA and DAMAZIN CAMPS, as well as the KHARTOUM TANNERY.

The CW advised that MOHAMED SULIEMAN AL-NALFI, aka ABU

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MUSAB, also held two accounts at the AL-SHAMAL BANK in Khartoum for two different Libyan terrorist groups called GAMA AL-LIBYA AL-MUKATILA and the LIBYIAN JIHAD GROUP. The CW advised that these groups had members in the ISLAMIC ARMY and representation in OSAMA BIN LADIN's SHURA COUNCIL. These two groups had ties with OSAMA BIN LADIN dating back to Afghanistan.

The CW advised that OSAMA BIN LADIN would often designate separate accounts for different terrorist groups and that AL-TAYYIB controlled the flow of money to the groups on behalf of OSAMA BIN LADIN.

The CW advised that money donated to Islamic causes, i.e. from wealthy individuals in the Gulf area, money collected in Europe, and money collected from groups, was sent to OSAMA BIN LADIN instead of the groups themselves. The CW advised that this was done to avoid misuse from the groups because these people trusted OSAMA BIN LADIN more, and they believed that the money controlled by OSAMA BIN LADIN would be used more effectively by various terrorist groups because of OSAMA BIN LADIN's ideology and reputation. The CW advised that this money came to OSAMA BIN LADIN and was subsequently controlled by AL-TAYYIB.

The CW advised that when he last saw AL-TAYYIB, he (AL-TAYYIB) was married and resided in an OSAMA BIN LADIN guesthouse in the Riyadh section of Khartoum. AL-TAYYIB lived on the second floor, as did SA'AD AL-SHARIF. The CW advised that AL-SHARIF was incharge of the ISLAMIC ARMY's FATWA and INFORMATION COMMITTEES. On the first floor lived ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI and ABU HAFS AL-KHIBIR. The CW further advised that across the street from this guesthouse lived ABDU AL-MUKHLAF, OSAMA BIN LADIN's driver and bodyguard.

The following is a list of activities conducted by the ISLAMIC ARMY that were told to the CW by AL-TAYYIB:

1) The CW advised that approximately two to three months after SHEIKH OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN was arrested in the United States (US), the ISLAMIC ARMY had general discussions about retaliating against the US in the US. AL-TAYYIB mentioned to the

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CW that ABU KHADIJA AL-IRAQI, USAMA LUBNANI, and an Iranian Shia whose name he could not remember, were sent to Cuba through Europe. The CW believes that ABU KHADIJA AL-IRAQI may be a US citizen. The CW advised that one or all of these individuals were to go to the US and conduct a terrorist act in retaliation. AL-TAYYIB told the CW that the ISLAMIC ARMY had people in the US. The CW advised that he was not privy to any specific operational plans and further advised that he never heard of any such retaliatory operation taking place. The CW believed that the Iranian government was aware of this plan because of the unknown Iranian and USAMA LUBNANI.

The CW advised that in the past, USAMA LUBNANI had facilitated travel documents and housing at the HARAK guesthouse for eight OSAMA BIN LADIN associates who were sent to Lebanon to train with HIZBOLLAH. The CW advised that since Iran supported HIZBOLLAH, the Iranians would therefore know about OSAMA BIN LADIN's associates training in Lebanon. The CW further advised that ASAIFI AHMEDI/MOHAMADI, an Iranian IO (the CW was not sure if ASAIFI's last name was AHMEDI or MOHAMADI) and SHEIKH AN'NORMANI were associated with OSAMA BIN LADIN and the ISLAMIC ARMY. The CW advised that AN'NORMANI held an official Iranian title as a religious ambassador responsible for the Horn of Africa and stationed in Khartoum. The CW believes that both ASAIFI and AN'NORMANI were also responsible for facilitating the eight OSAMA BIN LADIN associates being trained in Lebanon. The CW recalls five of the eight individuals as follows: ABU JAFER AL-TAYAR, ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI, ABU TALHA AL-SUDANI, HAYDAR AL-DOSARI, and SALAM AL-MASRI.

On a side note, the CW advised that ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI, ABU HAJER AL-IRAQI, and ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI were sent to Iran with AL-BANSHIRI going more than once.

2) The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB told him that when the Somalia crisis started, OSAMA BIN LADIN's group and the NIF thought that the US was behind the United Nations (UN) decision to send the military to Somalia. Both the ISLAMIC ARMY and the NIF were nervous because they thought that the UN and the US would come into the south of Sudan after Somalia to end the civil

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war in Sudan. The CW advised that the SHURA COUNCIL issued a FATWA to support any efforts to get the UN and US out of Somalia. At this time, the CW was ordered by AL-TAYYIB to stop his daily business activities. Approximately two to three months later, the CW was told by AL-TAYYIB that he (CW) would be sent to Somalia because of his combat and logistic experiences from Afghanistan. At a later date, the CW was told the same thing by ABU UBAIDAH AL-BANSHIRI. The CW advised that he never went to Somalia.

3) The CW advised that he was told by AL-TAYYIB to work with ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI in Port Sudan. ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI told the CW that he (CW) was to help with the security of sending a truck containing two containers of explosives from Khartoum to Port Sudan the following day. With the CW on this trip was ABU NAIM AL-LIBI (the driver), ABU ALI AL-SUDANI, and a fourth person whose name he does not recall. The CW advised that ABU ALI AL-SUDANI is an NIF member and IO from the DELEGATION OFFICE who was assigned to OSAMA BIN LADIN's bodyguard detail. The truck that was used to transport the explosives was an OSAMA BIN LADIN vehicle from the QUADARAT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY which used a Sudanese military licences plate. When they got to Port Sudan, the CW met ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI at the Palace Hotel. With ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI was IBRAHIM AHMED MAHMUD, aka ABU KHOBAB who was told by ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI to bring the truck to a military hangar. That night, the CW saw ABU KHOBAB, MOHAMED JARNEBI, ABU AYOUB AL-IRAQI, MOHAMED ELAMIN, ABU HAFS AL-MANSURI (Egyptian) and others place the two containers into other containers. The containers were then brought to the south port of Port Sudan and placed on a ship whose name ended with TAL. The next day, ABU KHOBAB told the CW that the ship was going to Saudi Arabia via Yemen. When the CW returned to Khartoum, AL-TAYYIB also told the CW that the explosives were going to Saudi Arabia via Yemen. Common knowledge throughout the ISLAMIC ARMY was that the explosives were going to be used against the US military in Saudi Arabia.

A few months later, AL-TAYYIB told the CW that HAYDAR AL-DOSARI and his group were arrested in Saudi Arabia. The CW advised that AL-TAYYIB was relieved because the Saudis arrested

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AL-DOSARI for an unrelated matter. Al-TAYYIB told the CW that because of the arrest, the operation was postponed. AL-TAYYIB later told the CW that AL-DOSARI never told the Saudis about the operation.

The CW advised that he was told, possibly by AL-TAYYIB, that the explosives were destined for IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI who resided in eastern Saudi Arabia. The CW advised that IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI started with AZMARAI in Afghanistan after IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI's brother was recruited by AZMARAI. IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI later joined AL-QAIDA and went to Sudan with the ISLAMIC ARMY. At the start of AL-QAIDA, IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI was a leader of the MANAKANDO area near Khost, Afghanistan for AL-QAIDA. At this time, the CW was working under IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI, while HAYDAR AL-DOSARI was a JIHAD WAL CAMP military trainer at a HEKMATYAR base who would frequently come and fight under IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI. Furthermore, during late 1989 or early 1990, IBN AL-MUBARAK AL-SHARQAWI worked under AZMARAI on the frontline in Jalalabad City in the KHOSH GUM BAD area.

4) AL-TAYYIB told the CW that AZMARAI was doing a great job in Tajikistan and later showed the CW a video tape of AZMARAI leading an attack against the Tajikistan communists. The video tape showed the group prior to, during and after the attack. The tape also showed the results of the battle including Tajik corpses, many of which were decapitated, with human heads displayed on a table.

The CW advised that Al-TAYYIB and others had radios to communicate with various OSAMA BIN LADIN camps and guesthouses, for example, DAMAZIN, SOBA, PORT SUDAN, KASSALLA, SHENDI, etc. The CW advised that permission to use the radios was granted to the ISLAMIC ARMY by the Sudanese military.

The CW further advised that satellite telephones were used by OSAMA BIN LADIN, ABU HAMAM AL-SAUDI (supra), and SA'AD AL-SHARIF, aka ABU MOHAMED, the leader of both the Information and Fatwa Committees.

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The CW advised that the ISLAMIC ARMY used the following methods to communicate with each other: mobile telephones, verbal and/or coded messages by courier, walkie-talkies, and an invisible ink pen with a blue light to read messages. The CW advised that these pens were purchased by ABDEL AZIZ MOHAMED ISSAWI in Cologne, Germany. The CW advised that the ISLAMIC ARMY also had communications centers in Khartoum. One which was located on McNimer Street and a second located in a OSAMA BIN LADIN guesthouse in the Square 9 area of the Riyahd section of Khartoum.

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